Methodological issues in epistemology and moral psychology

Between 1960 and 1999, it was quite common for philosophers to rely almost completely on a priori methods to advance their arguments (Knobe, 2015); in a recent study by Knobe, the majority of papers sampled from this period used strictly a priori methods. In contrast, in the last decade and a half, many philosophers' strategy for making progress on philosophical questions has changed. Philosophers are now relying more heavily on empirical data—including running their own observational and experimental studies—in order to support their arguments. Without a doubt, part of this shift was due to the rise of experimental philosophy – roughly a methodological approach to addressing philosophical questions wherein the researcher uses psychological methods to investigate the parameters that affect the deployment of philosophically significant concepts. This dissertation raises methodological problems with work in experimental philosophy and then proposes solutions to these problems. My focus in this dissertation is on two subfields in philosophy – epistemology and moral psychology – both of which have witnessed increased uses of psychological methods to investigate philosophical questions.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2016

Author dc:creator

• Horne, Zachary S

Contributors dc:contributor

• Waskan, Jonathan
• Hummel, John
• Livengood, Jonathan
• Korman, Daniel

• Philosophy
• Cognitive Science
• Epistemology

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2016 Zachary Horne

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/90726

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/90726