Methodological issues in epistemology and moral psychology
Between 1960 and 1999, it was quite common for philosophers to rely almost completely on a priori methods to advance their arguments (Knobe, 2015); in a recent study by Knobe, the majority of papers sampled from this period used strictly a priori methods. In contrast, in the last decade and a half, many philosophers' strategy for making progress on philosophical questions has changed. Philosophers are now relying more heavily on empirical data—including running their own observational and experimental studies—in order to support their arguments. Without a doubt, part of this shift was due to the rise of experimental philosophy – roughly a methodological approach to addressing philosophical questions wherein the researcher uses psychological methods to investigate the parameters that affect the deployment of philosophically significant concepts. This dissertation raises methodological problems with work in experimental philosophy and then proposes solutions to these problems. My focus in this dissertation is on two subfields in philosophy – epistemology and moral psychology – both of which have witnessed increased uses of psychological methods to investigate philosophical questions.
Philosophy, Cognitive Science, Epistemology
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign