The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position

Disagreement is epistemically significant. But this epistemic significance cuts in two directions. An independence principle (with respect to reliability assessments) says that my evaluations of the epistemic position of others must be independent of disputed beliefs (both the beliefs themselves and also the reasoning behind those beliefs). But this renders a set of beliefs - beliefs about the epistemic position of others - unresponsive to evidence. Disagreement is evidence that can be used in evaluating epistemic position, and it can be interpreted as evidence in dispute-dependent ways. A primary motivation for an independence principle is a desire to avoid begging the question and a view that a no question-begging norm entails independence. If this is so, then denying independence requires denying a no question-begging norm. However, a no question-begging norm does not entail independence, and therefore one can deny independence without rejecting a no question-begging norm. In the place of independence, I propose a principle of relative settledness (PRS) as a more sure guide for the epistemic significance of disagreement for our beliefs about others. PRS accounts for the fact that, with respect to the evidence of disagreement, some of our beliefs are more properly settled than others. The permissibility of evaluating epistemic position in dispute-dependent ways depends on the proper settledness of one’s disputed belief compared to the proper settledness of one’s belief about another’s epistemic position.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2024

Author dc:creator

• Baker, Derrick

Contributors dc:contributor

• Levinstein, Benjamin
• Kishida, Kohei
• Livengood, Jonathan
• Saenz, Noël

• Epistemic Significance Of Disagreement
• Epistemology Of Disagreement
• Peer Evaluation
• Independence
• Begging The Question
• Principle Of Relative Settledness
• Proper Settledness
• Stability Of Belief

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2024 Derrick Baker

Language dc:language

en, eng

Handle dc:identifier

https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541

OAI record oai:identifier

https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=etdms&identifier=oai%3Awww.ideals.illinois.edu%3A2142%2F125541