{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/125541"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/125541","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position","abstract":"Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2025-02-04 without embargo terms","abstract_html":"Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2025-02-04 without embargo terms","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Baker, Derrick"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Levinstein, Benjamin","Kishida, Kohei","Livengood, Jonathan","Saenz, Noël"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-07-09","date_published":"2024-07-09","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:02Z","subjects":["Epistemic Significance Of Disagreement","Epistemology Of Disagreement","Peer Evaluation","Independence","Begging The Question","Principle Of Relative Settledness","Proper Settledness","Stability Of Belief"],"languages":["en","eng"],"rights":["Copyright 2024 Derrick Baker"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Levinstein, Benjamin","Kishida, Kohei","Livengood, Jonathan","Saenz, Noël"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Baker, Derrick"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2024-07-09","2024-08"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Epistemic Significance Of Disagreement","Epistemology Of Disagreement","Peer Evaluation","Independence","Begging The Question","Principle Of Relative Settledness","Proper Settledness","Stability Of Belief"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en","eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2024 Derrick Baker"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2025-02-04 without embargo terms","The student, Derrick Baker, accepted the attached license on 2024-06-26 at 14:21.","The student, Derrick Baker, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2024-06-26 at 14:32.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2024-07-09 at 12:18.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #20881 on 2025-02-04 at 21:03:57","Disagreement is epistemically significant. But this epistemic significance cuts in two directions. An independence principle (with respect to reliability assessments) says that my evaluations of the epistemic position of others must be independent of disputed beliefs (both the beliefs themselves and also the reasoning behind those beliefs). But this renders a set of beliefs - beliefs about the epistemic position of others - unresponsive to evidence. Disagreement is evidence that can be used in evaluating epistemic position, and it can be interpreted as evidence in dispute-dependent ways. A primary motivation for an independence principle is a desire to avoid begging the question and a view that a no question-begging norm entails independence. If this is so, then denying independence requires denying a no question-begging norm. However, a no question-begging norm does not entail independence, and therefore one can deny independence without rejecting a no question-begging norm. In the place of independence, I propose a principle of relative settledness (PRS) as a more sure guide for the epistemic significance of disagreement for our beliefs about others. PRS accounts for the fact that, with respect to the evidence of disagreement, some of our beliefs are more properly settled than others. The permissibility of evaluating epistemic position in dispute-dependent ways depends on the proper settledness of one’s disputed belief compared to the proper settledness of one’s belief about another’s epistemic position."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Levinstein, Benjamin","Kishida, Kohei","Livengood, Jonathan","Saenz, Noël"],"dc:creator":["Baker, Derrick"],"dc:date":["2024-07-09","2024-08"],"dc:description":["Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2025-02-04 without embargo terms","The student, Derrick Baker, accepted the attached license on 2024-06-26 at 14:21.","The student, Derrick Baker, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2024-06-26 at 14:32.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2024-07-09 at 12:18.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #20881 on 2025-02-04 at 21:03:57","Disagreement is epistemically significant. But this epistemic significance cuts in two directions. An independence principle (with respect to reliability assessments) says that my evaluations of the epistemic position of others must be independent of disputed beliefs (both the beliefs themselves and also the reasoning behind those beliefs). But this renders a set of beliefs - beliefs about the epistemic position of others - unresponsive to evidence. Disagreement is evidence that can be used in evaluating epistemic position, and it can be interpreted as evidence in dispute-dependent ways. A primary motivation for an independence principle is a desire to avoid begging the question and a view that a no question-begging norm entails independence. If this is so, then denying independence requires denying a no question-begging norm. However, a no question-begging norm does not entail independence, and therefore one can deny independence without rejecting a no question-begging norm. In the place of independence, I propose a principle of relative settledness (PRS) as a more sure guide for the epistemic significance of disagreement for our beliefs about others. PRS accounts for the fact that, with respect to the evidence of disagreement, some of our beliefs are more properly settled than others. The permissibility of evaluating epistemic position in dispute-dependent ways depends on the proper settledness of one’s disputed belief compared to the proper settledness of one’s belief about another’s epistemic position."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541"],"dc:language":["en","eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2024 Derrick Baker"],"dc:subject":["Epistemic Significance Of Disagreement","Epistemology Of Disagreement","Peer Evaluation","Independence","Begging The Question","Principle Of Relative Settledness","Proper Settledness","Stability Of Belief"],"dc:title":["The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position"],"dc:type":["text","Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:02Z"}