Abstract
dc:description.abstract<p>In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice environments. The first two models demonstrate how collective choice procedures provide opportunities for informed communicators to manipulate outcomes by strategically obfuscating information to appeal to different coalitions at different times. Paradoxically, the members of the collective choice institution are often better off gathering no information at all rather than relying on an expert who manipulates outcomes in this way. The final chapter characterizes the incentives of candidates to reveal information about their preferences to voters in an election when multiple policy issues are at stake. I show that candidates can credibly reveal directional information about their preferences but will leave the voters uncertain about which candidate is more extreme.</p>
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Political Science
- Year dc:date.available
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Schnakenberg, Keith Evan
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Elizabeth M Penn
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
- Language dc:language
- English (en)
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:etd-2260