In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice environments. The first two models demonstrate how collective choice procedures provide opportunities for informed communicators to manipulate outcomes by strategically obfuscating information to appeal to different coalitions at different times. Paradoxically, the members of the collective choice institution are often better off gathering no information at all rather than relying on an expert who manipulates outcomes in this way. The final chapter characterizes the incentives of candidates to reveal information about their preferences to voters in an election when multiple policy issues are at stake. I show that candidates can credibly reveal directional information about their preferences but will leave the voters uncertain about which candidate is more extreme.
","abstract_html":"<p>In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice environments. The first two models demonstrate how collective choice procedures provide opportunities for informed communicators to manipulate outcomes by strategically obfuscating information to appeal to different coalitions at different times. Paradoxically, the members of the collective choice institution are often better off gathering no information at all rather than relying on an expert who manipulates outcomes in this way. The final chapter characterizes the incentives of candidates to reveal information about their preferences to voters in an election when multiple policy issues are at stake. I show that candidates can credibly reveal directional information about their preferences but will leave the voters uncertain about which candidate is more extreme.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Schnakenberg, Keith Evan"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Elizabeth M Penn"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-04-17T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2014-04-17T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:25Z","subjects":["game theory","legislative politics","signaling","social choice"],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7CN7214"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7CN7214","href":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7CN7214","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1260","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Elizabeth M Penn"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Schnakenberg, Keith Evan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-27T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["game theory","legislative politics","signaling","social choice"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1260"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7CN7214"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice environments. The first two models demonstrate how collective choice procedures provide opportunities for informed communicators to manipulate outcomes by strategically obfuscating information to appeal to different coalitions at different times. Paradoxically, the members of the collective choice institution are often better off gathering no information at all rather than relying on an expert who manipulates outcomes in this way. The final chapter characterizes the incentives of candidates to reveal information about their preferences to voters in an election when multiple policy issues are at stake. I show that candidates can credibly reveal directional information about their preferences but will leave the voters uncertain about which candidate is more extreme.
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