Competence, Expertise, and Linguistic Communities

This difference in requirements for the two groups hinges upon a distinction between belief and attributed belief, or what one actually believes versus what one is thought to believe. I argue that expertise involves playing a social role and thus is not simply a matter of having many relevant beliefs on a subject; a speaker will not rely on an expert if he does not believe her to be one. This dependence on attributed belief sometimes results in a community's taking as experts people who perhaps should not be; although philosophers tend to gloss over problems caused by ignorant or deceptive experts, this is a mistake. I discuss a number of ways in which such experts can cause trouble for competent speakers; in extreme cases, the social structure may break down and the linguistic community fracture into disparate segments. Although it is not possible to ensure that reliance on experts will always function smoothly, I note some ways to improve our practice and point out directions for future work.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Neely, Erica Leigh

Contributors dc:contributor

• Ebbs, Gary

• Language, Linguistics

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3182334

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87594