Abstract
dc:description"The third chapter examines multi-year dynamic response of CEO compensation to firm performance. Multi-period agency theories posit that the CEO's current performance can be compensated both today and tomorrow. This study investigates the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance by using partial adjustment models of CEO pay. I find that target pay levels are set on ""long-run"" past firm performance and that the deviation of the actual pay level causes near-complete convergence to the target in one year. Such effects are more pronounced for the firms with weaker external corporate governance. Overall, the findings here indicate that a pay-for-contemporaneous-only-performance relationship significantly understates the incentive effects of CEO pay."
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Human Resources and Industrial Relations
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Ahn, Ji-Young
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Craig Olson
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (MiAaPQ)AAI3337681
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87478