{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87478"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87478","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Three Essays on Managerial Compensation","abstract":"\"The third chapter examines multi-year dynamic response of CEO compensation to firm performance. Multi-period agency theories posit that the CEO's current performance can be compensated both today and tomorrow. This study investigates the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance by using partial adjustment models of CEO pay. I find that target pay levels are set on \"\"long-run\"\" past firm performance and that the deviation of the actual pay level causes near-complete convergence to the target in one year. Such effects are more pronounced for the firms with weaker external corporate governance. 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