Rationalizability and Monotonicity in Large Auctions With Noise Traders

For models with ex ante heterogeneity, since models are not restricted in the way of adding a new player as long as new player's private signal distribution satisfies the regularity conditions, the limit economy may not be well defined. Thus, we are only interested in the models with replicated players where limit trading models are well defined. We show that in those restricted models, the set of interim rationalizable bidding strategies converges to the Nash equilibrium of the auctions in the limit.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Lee, Soonho

Contributors dc:contributor

• Cho, In-Koo

• Economics, Theory

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3242914

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85573