{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85573"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85573","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Rationalizability and Monotonicity in Large Auctions With Noise Traders","abstract":"For models with ex ante heterogeneity, since models are not restricted in the way of adding a new player as long as new player's private signal distribution satisfies the regularity conditions, the limit economy may not be well defined. Thus, we are only interested in the models with replicated players where limit trading models are well defined. We show that in those restricted models, the set of interim rationalizable bidding strategies converges to the Nash equilibrium of the auctions in the limit.","abstract_html":"For models with ex ante heterogeneity, since models are not restricted in the way of adding a new player as long as new player's private signal distribution satisfies the regularity conditions, the limit economy may not be well defined. Thus, we are only interested in the models with replicated players where limit trading models are well defined. We show that in those restricted models, the set of interim rationalizable bidding strategies converges to the Nash equilibrium of the auctions in the limit.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Lee, Soonho"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Cho, In-Koo"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-25T22:47:27Z","date_published":"2015-09-25T22:47:27Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:25Z","subjects":["Economics, Theory"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3242914"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3242914","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85573","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Cho, In-Koo"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Lee, Soonho"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-25T22:47:27Z","10000-01-01","2006"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics, Theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85573","(MiAaPQ)AAI3242914"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["For models with ex ante heterogeneity, since models are not restricted in the way of adding a new player as long as new player's private signal distribution satisfies the regularity conditions, the limit economy may not be well defined. 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