Irrigation Water Pricing: Technology Adoption, Welfare, and Political Economy

The second chapter deals with the political economy of water pricing and its implications on the adoption of modern irrigation technology in the presence of asymmetric information and lobbies. The main results are that under the two-part tariff or the nonlinear pricing, farmers have an incentive to organize and can organize to affect the outcome of water schedule design in their favor; the exception being the inflated marginal cost tariff, which is lobby-independent. In terms of expected welfare, the two-part tariff is preferable to the nonlinear pricing scheme or the inflated marginal cost tariff.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Agricultural and Consumer Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Dridi, Chokri

Contributors dc:contributor

• Khanna, Madhu

• Economics, Agricultural

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3182254

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/82972