{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/82972"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/82972","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Irrigation Water Pricing: Technology Adoption, Welfare, and Political Economy","abstract":"The second chapter deals with the political economy of water pricing and its implications on the adoption of modern irrigation technology in the presence of asymmetric information and lobbies. The main results are that under the two-part tariff or the nonlinear pricing, farmers have an incentive to organize and can organize to affect the outcome of water schedule design in their favor; the exception being the inflated marginal cost tariff, which is lobby-independent. In terms of expected welfare, the two-part tariff is preferable to the nonlinear pricing scheme or the inflated marginal cost tariff.","abstract_html":"The second chapter deals with the political economy of water pricing and its implications on the adoption of modern irrigation technology in the presence of asymmetric information and lobbies. The main results are that under the two-part tariff or the nonlinear pricing, farmers have an incentive to organize and can organize to affect the outcome of water schedule design in their favor; the exception being the inflated marginal cost tariff, which is lobby-independent. In terms of expected welfare, the two-part tariff is preferable to the nonlinear pricing scheme or the inflated marginal cost tariff.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Dridi, Chokri"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Agricultural and Consumer Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Khanna, Madhu"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-25T20:55:37Z","date_published":"2015-09-25T20:55:37Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:20Z","subjects":["Economics, Agricultural"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3182254"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3182254","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/82972","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Khanna, Madhu"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Dridi, Chokri"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-25T20:55:37Z","10000-01-01","2005"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Agricultural and Consumer Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics, Agricultural"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/82972","(MiAaPQ)AAI3182254"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The second chapter deals with the political economy of water pricing and its implications on the adoption of modern irrigation technology in the presence of asymmetric information and lobbies. The main results are that under the two-part tariff or the nonlinear pricing, farmers have an incentive to organize and can organize to affect the outcome of water schedule design in their favor; the exception being the inflated marginal cost tariff, which is lobby-independent. In terms of expected welfare, the two-part tariff is preferable to the nonlinear pricing scheme or the inflated marginal cost tariff.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:55:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3182254.pdf: 2347667 bytes, checksum: d89fb04a1e16ec6c03035710e54d2e43 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 84253 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","97 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Irrigation Water Pricing: Technology Adoption, Welfare, and Political Economy"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Khanna, Madhu"],"dc:creator":["Dridi, Chokri"],"dc:date":["2015-09-25T20:55:37Z","10000-01-01","2005"],"dc:description":["The second chapter deals with the political economy of water pricing and its implications on the adoption of modern irrigation technology in the presence of asymmetric information and lobbies. The main results are that under the two-part tariff or the nonlinear pricing, farmers have an incentive to organize and can organize to affect the outcome of water schedule design in their favor; the exception being the inflated marginal cost tariff, which is lobby-independent. In terms of expected welfare, the two-part tariff is preferable to the nonlinear pricing scheme or the inflated marginal cost tariff.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:55:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3182254.pdf: 2347667 bytes, checksum: d89fb04a1e16ec6c03035710e54d2e43 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 84253 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","97 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/82972","(MiAaPQ)AAI3182254"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:subject":["Economics, Agricultural"],"dc:title":["Irrigation Water Pricing: Technology Adoption, Welfare, and Political Economy"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Agricultural and Consumer Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:20Z"}