The Use of Noncooperative Games to Determine Strategic Bidding in Centralized Electricity Markets

However, if there is a periodical repetition of market conditions over time, it might lead to the playing of similar, repeated games (or supergames) by the participants. This repetition of games tempts participants to walk away from the best-response equilibrium strategies provided by Nash solutions. Although Nash solutions make theoretical sense in nonrepeated games, their applicability in repeated games is weakened by the fact that these solutions are not, in general, Pareto optimal. This fact paves the way to more complex games where participants are driven by profit maximization in the long run and are, therefore, enticed to explore different solutions in the short term. Knowing that they will meet in similar games in the near future makes the players adopt implicit cooperative behavior, and the willingness to work to a common end may be modeled in automata or agents, which substitute the players, that must adopt stochastic responses to the other automata strategic moves as a means to mask rationality.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Electrical Engineering

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Correia, Pedro Alexandre Flores

Contributors dc:contributor

• Overbye, Thomas J.

• Engineering, Electronics and Electrical

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3070283

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/80786