{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/80786"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/80786","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"The Use of Noncooperative Games to Determine Strategic Bidding in Centralized Electricity Markets","abstract":"However, if there is a periodical repetition of market conditions over time, it might lead to the playing of similar, repeated games (or supergames) by the participants. This repetition of games tempts participants to walk away from the best-response equilibrium strategies provided by Nash solutions. Although Nash solutions make theoretical sense in nonrepeated games, their applicability in repeated games is weakened by the fact that these solutions are not, in general, Pareto optimal. This fact paves the way to more complex games where participants are driven by profit maximization in the long run and are, therefore, enticed to explore different solutions in the short term. Knowing that they will meet in similar games in the near future makes the players adopt implicit cooperative behavior, and the willingness to work to a common end may be modeled in automata or agents, which substitute the players, that must adopt stochastic responses to the other automata strategic moves as a means to mask rationality.","abstract_html":"However, if there is a periodical repetition of market conditions over time, it might lead to the playing of similar, repeated games (or supergames) by the participants. This repetition of games tempts participants to walk away from the best-response equilibrium strategies provided by Nash solutions. Although Nash solutions make theoretical sense in nonrepeated games, their applicability in repeated games is weakened by the fact that these solutions are not, in general, Pareto optimal. This fact paves the way to more complex games where participants are driven by profit maximization in the long run and are, therefore, enticed to explore different solutions in the short term. Knowing that they will meet in similar games in the near future makes the players adopt implicit cooperative behavior, and the willingness to work to a common end may be modeled in automata or agents, which substitute the players, that must adopt stochastic responses to the other automata strategic moves as a means to mask rationality.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Correia, Pedro Alexandre Flores"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Electrical Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Overbye, Thomas J."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-25T20:08:10Z","date_published":"2015-09-25T20:08:10Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:14Z","subjects":["Engineering, Electronics and Electrical"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3070283"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3070283","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/80786","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Overbye, Thomas J."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Correia, Pedro Alexandre Flores"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-25T20:08:10Z","10000-01-01","2002"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Engineering, Electronics and Electrical"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/80786","(MiAaPQ)AAI3070283"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["However, if there is a periodical repetition of market conditions over time, it might lead to the playing of similar, repeated games (or supergames) by the participants. 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This repetition of games tempts participants to walk away from the best-response equilibrium strategies provided by Nash solutions. Although Nash solutions make theoretical sense in nonrepeated games, their applicability in repeated games is weakened by the fact that these solutions are not, in general, Pareto optimal. This fact paves the way to more complex games where participants are driven by profit maximization in the long run and are, therefore, enticed to explore different solutions in the short term. Knowing that they will meet in similar games in the near future makes the players adopt implicit cooperative behavior, and the willingness to work to a common end may be modeled in automata or agents, which substitute the players, that must adopt stochastic responses to the other automata strategic moves as a means to mask rationality.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:08:10Z (GMT). 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