Classical logic and its rivals

Classical logic and a given nonclassical logic are, by definition, incompatible in some sense. In some cases, this incompatibility is innocuous. In other cases, the nonclassical logic is incompatible with classical logic on a fundamental level, such that the two logics can be seen as rival theories of logical entailment and only one of them can succeed. I will explore the structure of these cases of logical rivalry by considering three examples: Dummett’s antirealism, Putnam’s response to results of quantum mechanics, and Tye’s response to vagueness. I will show that, despite the differences between these cases’ motivations and methods, they nevertheless all conform to a particular framework in challenging classical logic. Moreover, these diverse cases all characterize classical logic as the result of an unwarranted generalization from a limited and apparently privileged realm of entailment.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Goodlin, Blair

Contributors dc:contributor

• McCarthy, Timothy G.
• Chandler, Hugh S.
• Wagner, Steven J.
• Wengert, Robert G.

• Philosophy of Logic
• Philosophy of Language

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2013 Blair F. Goodlin Jr.

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/46768

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/46768