{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/46768"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/46768","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Classical logic and its rivals","abstract":"Classical logic and a given nonclassical logic are, by definition, incompatible in some sense. In some cases, this incompatibility is innocuous. In other cases, the nonclassical logic is incompatible with classical logic on a fundamental level, such that the two logics can be seen as rival theories of logical entailment and only one of them can succeed. I will explore the structure of these cases of logical rivalry by considering three examples: Dummett’s antirealism, Putnam’s response to results of quantum mechanics, and Tye’s response to vagueness. I will show that, despite the differences between these cases’ motivations and methods, they nevertheless all conform to a particular framework in challenging classical logic. Moreover, these diverse cases all characterize classical logic as the result of an unwarranted generalization from a limited and apparently privileged realm of entailment.","abstract_html":"Classical logic and a given nonclassical logic are, by definition, incompatible in some sense. In some cases, this incompatibility is innocuous. In other cases, the nonclassical logic is incompatible with classical logic on a fundamental level, such that the two logics can be seen as rival theories of logical entailment and only one of them can succeed. I will explore the structure of these cases of logical rivalry by considering three examples: Dummett’s antirealism, Putnam’s response to results of quantum mechanics, and Tye’s response to vagueness. I will show that, despite the differences between these cases’ motivations and methods, they nevertheless all conform to a particular framework in challenging classical logic. Moreover, these diverse cases all characterize classical logic as the result of an unwarranted generalization from a limited and apparently privileged realm of entailment.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Goodlin, Blair"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["McCarthy, Timothy G.","Chandler, Hugh S.","Wagner, Steven J.","Wengert, Robert G."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-01-16T18:01:50Z","date_published":"2014-01-16T18:01:50Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:36Z","subjects":["Philosophy of Logic","Philosophy of Language"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2013 Blair F. Goodlin Jr."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/46768","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["McCarthy, Timothy G.","Chandler, Hugh S.","Wagner, Steven J.","Wengert, Robert G."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Goodlin, Blair"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2014-01-16T18:01:50Z","2013-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy of Logic","Philosophy of Language"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2013 Blair F. 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I will explore the structure of these cases of logical rivalry by considering three examples: Dummett’s antirealism, Putnam’s response to results of quantum mechanics, and Tye’s response to vagueness. I will show that, despite the differences between these cases’ motivations and methods, they nevertheless all conform to a particular framework in challenging classical logic. Moreover, these diverse cases all characterize classical logic as the result of an unwarranted generalization from a limited and apparently privileged realm of entailment.","Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2013-12-03T22:03:55Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Goodlin_Blair.pdf: 460247 bytes, checksum: 0118bba8275390c168fb926ed4b8e6ed (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2014-01-16T18:01:50Z (GMT). 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