A Kantian critique of David Lewis's modal realism

"In this thesis, the modal realist metaphysics of modality of David Lewis is subjected to a Kantian critique. Modal realism is the theory that possible worlds are the sorts of things our actual world is. Lewis's argument for modal realism in ""Possible Worlds"" contains what in Kantian terms are synthetic apriori propositions. Kant's answer to the question of how synthetic apriori modal propositions are possible is examined. Kant is found to have erred in choosing de dicto modal concepts and principles, given his notion of an objective transcendental deduction, an argument which shows that, without these concepts, experience of objects would not be possible. The error is corrected by supplying de re modal concepts (i.e. essence and accident) and a new modal principle: the principle of essence and accident. I argue that the principle of essence and accident is a valid synthetic apriori modal principle. Lewis's argument for possible worlds is shown to be fallacious by pointing out that synthetic apriori principles do not imply the existence of transcendent entities. However, I put forth a ""practical grounds argument""--an argument from the necessary conditions of moral practice--for ""postulating"" concrete possible worlds. Finally, I propose a concept of concrete possible worlds that is more compatible with Kantian principles than is Lewis's conception."

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Eudaly, Thomas Doty

Contributors dc:contributor

• Shwayder, David S.

• Philosophy

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1989 Eudaly, Thomas Doty

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI8916243
(UMI)AAI8916243

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/22921