{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/22921"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/22921","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"A Kantian critique of David Lewis's modal realism","abstract":"\"In this thesis, the modal realist metaphysics of modality of David Lewis is subjected to a Kantian critique. Modal realism is the theory that possible worlds are the sorts of things our actual world is. Lewis's argument for modal realism in \"\"Possible Worlds\"\" contains what in Kantian terms are synthetic apriori propositions. Kant's answer to the question of how synthetic apriori modal propositions are possible is examined. Kant is found to have erred in choosing de dicto modal concepts and principles, given his notion of an objective transcendental deduction, an argument which shows that, without these concepts, experience of objects would not be possible. The error is corrected by supplying de re modal concepts (i.e. essence and accident) and a new modal principle: the principle of essence and accident. I argue that the principle of essence and accident is a valid synthetic apriori modal principle. Lewis's argument for possible worlds is shown to be fallacious by pointing out that synthetic apriori principles do not imply the existence of transcendent entities. However, I put forth a \"\"practical grounds argument\"\"--an argument from the necessary conditions of moral practice--for \"\"postulating\"\" concrete possible worlds. Finally, I propose a concept of concrete possible worlds that is more compatible with Kantian principles than is Lewis's conception.\"","abstract_html":""In this thesis, the modal realist metaphysics of modality of David Lewis is subjected to a Kantian critique. Modal realism is the theory that possible worlds are the sorts of things our actual world is. Lewis's argument for modal realism in ""Possible Worlds"" contains what in Kantian terms are synthetic apriori propositions. Kant's answer to the question of how synthetic apriori modal propositions are possible is examined. Kant is found to have erred in choosing de dicto modal concepts and principles, given his notion of an objective transcendental deduction, an argument which shows that, without these concepts, experience of objects would not be possible. The error is corrected by supplying de re modal concepts (i.e. essence and accident) and a new modal principle: the principle of essence and accident. I argue that the principle of essence and accident is a valid synthetic apriori modal principle. Lewis's argument for possible worlds is shown to be fallacious by pointing out that synthetic apriori principles do not imply the existence of transcendent entities. However, I put forth a ""practical grounds argument""--an argument from the necessary conditions of moral practice--for ""postulating"" concrete possible worlds. Finally, I propose a concept of concrete possible worlds that is more compatible with Kantian principles than is Lewis's conception."","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Eudaly, Thomas Doty"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Shwayder, David S."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T13:55:56Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T13:55:56Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:20Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1989 Eudaly, Thomas Doty"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI8916243","(UMI)AAI8916243"],"render_values":[{"text":"AAI8916243","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI8916243","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/22921","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Shwayder, David S."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Eudaly, Thomas Doty"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-05-07T13:55:56Z","10000-01-01","1989"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 1989 Eudaly, Thomas Doty"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI8916243","(UMI)AAI8916243","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/22921"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"In this thesis, the modal realist metaphysics of modality of David Lewis is subjected to a Kantian critique. Modal realism is the theory that possible worlds are the sorts of things our actual world is. Lewis's argument for modal realism in \"\"Possible Worlds\"\" contains what in Kantian terms are synthetic apriori propositions. Kant's answer to the question of how synthetic apriori modal propositions are possible is examined. Kant is found to have erred in choosing de dicto modal concepts and principles, given his notion of an objective transcendental deduction, an argument which shows that, without these concepts, experience of objects would not be possible. The error is corrected by supplying de re modal concepts (i.e. essence and accident) and a new modal principle: the principle of essence and accident. I argue that the principle of essence and accident is a valid synthetic apriori modal principle. Lewis's argument for possible worlds is shown to be fallacious by pointing out that synthetic apriori principles do not imply the existence of transcendent entities. However, I put forth a \"\"practical grounds argument\"\"--an argument from the necessary conditions of moral practice--for \"\"postulating\"\" concrete possible worlds. Finally, I propose a concept of concrete possible worlds that is more compatible with Kantian principles than is Lewis's conception.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:55:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 8916243.pdf: 2820709 bytes, checksum: 5a4360e37e63b5b575c829ba3bb3ea38 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1989","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T15:00:56Z Item is restricted indefinitely.","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:28:52-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","U of I Only"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["A Kantian critique of David Lewis's modal realism"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Shwayder, David S."],"dc:creator":["Eudaly, Thomas Doty"],"dc:date":["2011-05-07T13:55:56Z","10000-01-01","1989"],"dc:description":["\"In this thesis, the modal realist metaphysics of modality of David Lewis is subjected to a Kantian critique. Modal realism is the theory that possible worlds are the sorts of things our actual world is. Lewis's argument for modal realism in \"\"Possible Worlds\"\" contains what in Kantian terms are synthetic apriori propositions. Kant's answer to the question of how synthetic apriori modal propositions are possible is examined. Kant is found to have erred in choosing de dicto modal concepts and principles, given his notion of an objective transcendental deduction, an argument which shows that, without these concepts, experience of objects would not be possible. The error is corrected by supplying de re modal concepts (i.e. essence and accident) and a new modal principle: the principle of essence and accident. I argue that the principle of essence and accident is a valid synthetic apriori modal principle. Lewis's argument for possible worlds is shown to be fallacious by pointing out that synthetic apriori principles do not imply the existence of transcendent entities. However, I put forth a \"\"practical grounds argument\"\"--an argument from the necessary conditions of moral practice--for \"\"postulating\"\" concrete possible worlds. Finally, I propose a concept of concrete possible worlds that is more compatible with Kantian principles than is Lewis's conception.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:55:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 8916243.pdf: 2820709 bytes, checksum: 5a4360e37e63b5b575c829ba3bb3ea38 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1989","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T15:00:56Z Item is restricted indefinitely.","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:28:52-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","U of I Only"],"dc:identifier":["AAI8916243","(UMI)AAI8916243","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/22921"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 1989 Eudaly, Thomas Doty"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy"],"dc:title":["A Kantian critique of David Lewis's modal realism"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:20Z"}