The problem of logical omniscience

As standardly conceived, the problem of logical omniscience is a long-standing, if somewhat nebulous, problem confined to the fields of epistemology and logic. I argue for a broader and deeper conception of the problem than has been previously presented. The problem is broader than widely acknowledged in that engagements with aspects of semantics, pragmatics, computational theory, information theory, and philosophy of mind are essential to offering a full analysis of which logical consequences are accessible to an agent in light of what she explicitly accepts. The problem is deeper than recognized in that it bears significantly on influential accounts of knowledge, belief, rationality, rational agency, reasoning, et cetera. Having made the case for a new conception of the problem, I proceed to sharpen this conception by outlining a general logical framework for representing and analyzing computational tasks. The framework models the computational costs of an agent’s inferences as she carries out a given task in accordance with her chosen strategy. As part of this framework, I introduce a pair of conceptual innovations—dynamic rule creation and incertitude—in order to permit a more plausible account of the reasoning and epistemic states of agents.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2025

Author dc:creator

• Estrup, Adam

Contributors dc:contributor

• Kishida, Kohei
• Lasersohn, Peter N
• Scharp, Kevin
• Levinstein, Benjamin A
• Livengood, Jonathan

• logical omniscience

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2025 Adam Estrup

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

https://hdl.handle.net/2142/132637

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/132637