{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/132637"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/132637","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"The problem of logical omniscience","abstract":"As standardly conceived, the problem of logical omniscience is a long-standing, if somewhat nebulous, problem confined to the fields of epistemology and logic. I argue for a broader and deeper conception of the problem than has been previously presented. The problem is broader than widely acknowledged in that engagements with aspects of semantics, pragmatics, computational theory, information theory, and philosophy of mind are essential to offering a full analysis of which logical consequences are accessible to an agent in light of what she explicitly accepts. The problem is deeper than recognized in that it bears significantly on influential accounts of knowledge, belief, rationality, rational agency, reasoning, et cetera. Having made the case for a new conception of the problem, I proceed to sharpen this conception by outlining a general logical framework for representing and analyzing computational tasks. The framework models the computational costs of an agent’s inferences as she carries out a given task in accordance with her chosen strategy. As part of this framework, I introduce a pair of conceptual innovations—dynamic rule creation and incertitude—in order to permit a more plausible account of the reasoning and epistemic states of agents.","abstract_html":"As standardly conceived, the problem of logical omniscience is a long-standing, if somewhat nebulous, problem confined to the fields of epistemology and logic. I argue for a broader and deeper conception of the problem than has been previously presented. The problem is broader than widely acknowledged in that engagements with aspects of semantics, pragmatics, computational theory, information theory, and philosophy of mind are essential to offering a full analysis of which logical consequences are accessible to an agent in light of what she explicitly accepts. The problem is deeper than recognized in that it bears significantly on influential accounts of knowledge, belief, rationality, rational agency, reasoning, et cetera. Having made the case for a new conception of the problem, I proceed to sharpen this conception by outlining a general logical framework for representing and analyzing computational tasks. The framework models the computational costs of an agent’s inferences as she carries out a given task in accordance with her chosen strategy. As part of this framework, I introduce a pair of conceptual innovations—dynamic rule creation and incertitude—in order to permit a more plausible account of the reasoning and epistemic states of agents.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Estrup, Adam"],"institution":"University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Kishida, Kohei","Lasersohn, Peter N","Scharp, Kevin","Levinstein, Benjamin A","Livengood, Jonathan"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-12","date_published":"2025-12","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:07Z","subjects":["logical omniscience"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2025 Adam Estrup"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2142/132637","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Kishida, Kohei","Lasersohn, Peter N","Scharp, Kevin","Levinstein, Benjamin A","Livengood, Jonathan"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Estrup, Adam"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2025-12","2025-11-10"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["logical omniscience"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2025 Adam Estrup"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/132637"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["As standardly conceived, the problem of logical omniscience is a long-standing, if somewhat nebulous, problem confined to the fields of epistemology and logic. I argue for a broader and deeper conception of the problem than has been previously presented. The problem is broader than widely acknowledged in that engagements with aspects of semantics, pragmatics, computational theory, information theory, and philosophy of mind are essential to offering a full analysis of which logical consequences are accessible to an agent in light of what she explicitly accepts. The problem is deeper than recognized in that it bears significantly on influential accounts of knowledge, belief, rationality, rational agency, reasoning, et cetera. Having made the case for a new conception of the problem, I proceed to sharpen this conception by outlining a general logical framework for representing and analyzing computational tasks. The framework models the computational costs of an agent’s inferences as she carries out a given task in accordance with her chosen strategy. As part of this framework, I introduce a pair of conceptual innovations—dynamic rule creation and incertitude—in order to permit a more plausible account of the reasoning and epistemic states of agents.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2027-12-01","The student, Adam Estrup, accepted the attached license on 2025-11-10 at 11:31.","The student, Adam Estrup, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2025-11-10 at 11:41.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2025-11-10 at 12:58.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #22855 on 2026-02-19 at 18:45:40"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The problem of logical omniscience"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Kishida, Kohei","Lasersohn, Peter N","Scharp, Kevin","Levinstein, Benjamin A","Livengood, Jonathan"],"dc:creator":["Estrup, Adam"],"dc:date":["2025-12","2025-11-10"],"dc:description":["As standardly conceived, the problem of logical omniscience is a long-standing, if somewhat nebulous, problem confined to the fields of epistemology and logic. I argue for a broader and deeper conception of the problem than has been previously presented. The problem is broader than widely acknowledged in that engagements with aspects of semantics, pragmatics, computational theory, information theory, and philosophy of mind are essential to offering a full analysis of which logical consequences are accessible to an agent in light of what she explicitly accepts. The problem is deeper than recognized in that it bears significantly on influential accounts of knowledge, belief, rationality, rational agency, reasoning, et cetera. Having made the case for a new conception of the problem, I proceed to sharpen this conception by outlining a general logical framework for representing and analyzing computational tasks. The framework models the computational costs of an agent’s inferences as she carries out a given task in accordance with her chosen strategy. As part of this framework, I introduce a pair of conceptual innovations—dynamic rule creation and incertitude—in order to permit a more plausible account of the reasoning and epistemic states of agents.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2027-12-01","The student, Adam Estrup, accepted the attached license on 2025-11-10 at 11:31.","The student, Adam Estrup, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2025-11-10 at 11:41.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2025-11-10 at 12:58.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #22855 on 2026-02-19 at 18:45:40"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/132637"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2025 Adam Estrup"],"dc:subject":["logical omniscience"],"dc:title":["The problem of logical omniscience"],"dc:type":["text","Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:07Z"}