From deterrence to emboldening: unveiling alliance commitments dynamics

When do alliance member states fulfill military commitments during peacetime? How can a patron’s peacetime military commitments influence a protégé’s decision to initiate militarized disputes? In my dissertation project, I propose a novel theory to address these questions. I introduce the concept of “peacetime alliance commitments”, which assumes that alliance commitments are not static but change over time. After the treaty is signed, not all patrons remain fully committed to supporting their protégés during peacetime. Patrons can alter their level of commitment based on their interests and various international and domestic factors. The extent to which patrons fulfill alliance commitments during peacetime critically affects perceptions of alliance credibility, and this factor is pivotal in shaping the military actions of minor states. To examine peacetime military commitments from 1945 to 2023, I created an original dataset for my dissertation project. In compiling this dataset, I identified seven distinct types of peacetime military commitments strongly associated with an alliance's credibility: integrated command, joint military exercises, military aid, foreign military training, military bases, alliance military organizations, and official military consultations. The dataset includes information on whether each member state of the alliance has fulfilled these commitments or if the patron has provided additional commitments to its protégé. With this collected dataset, I test my argument about whether the level of threat-sharing between a patron and a protégé affects the patron’s willingness to fulfill alliance commitments during peacetime. This decision is primarily influenced by the level of security threats it faces. Specifically, I contend that patrons experiencing severe mutual threats with their protégés are more likely to provide higher levels of peacetime military commitments, such as deploying troops or establishing integrated command structures. When both parties face severe mutual threats, they become strategically highly important to each other. In this situation, the patron will attempt to support the protégé militarily and exert strong influence to direct control over them. If protégés do not share direct adversaries with the patron, the patron is less likely to intervene in their conflicts. Instead, they encourage allies to bolster their own defenses through military training or aid. Without a mutual enemy, patrons are less motivated to protect their protégés, and their alliance commitments are mainly diplomatic consultation levels. I then examine how such variation affects interstate conflict. I argue that the level of a patron's military commitments during peacetime significantly influences the protégé’s decisions to initiate militarized interstate disputes against its adversaries. When patrons provide robust military support and assistance, protégés are more likely to feel emboldened. However, certain peacetime alliance commitments, such as integrated command structures and basing arrangements, promote restraint among assertive protégés, as these types of commitments serve as tools for patrons to restrain their protégés, thus preventing undesirable and risky wars. Finally, when the protégé receives only lower-cost alliance military commitments, such as regular meetings, the credibility of the patron’s commitment to militarily support the protégé is called into question, and the protégé is less likely to initiate conflicts due to the perceived lack of assurance in the patron's military assistance. By addressing this question, I aim to closely examine the types of military commitments within alliances that can potentially either restrain or embolden minor allies.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Political Science

Grantor

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2025

Author dc:creator

• Lee, Jinwon

Contributors dc:contributor

• Prorok, Alyssa
• Diehl, Paul
• Gaines, Brian
• Carroll, Robert

• Military Alliance
• Extended Deterrence
• International Security
• Conflict

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2025 Jinwon Lee

Language dc:language

en, eng

Handle dc:identifier

https://hdl.handle.net/2142/130044

OAI record oai:identifier

https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=etdms&identifier=oai%3Awww.ideals.illinois.edu%3A2142%2F130044