GPS ephemeris spoofing

GPS is a critical source of positioning and timing information for critical systems in a high number of civilian and military sectors. Although classic spoofing techniques have been thoroughly discussed and certain countermeasures enacted for certain use cases, there still is not a robust solution. We demonstrate that it is possible to trick a modern GPS receiver with a new spoofing technique: ephemeris spoofing. We demonstrate that an attacker can trick a receiver to alculate a false position, given control of the navigation data fed into the receiver, without actually emitting a GPS signal. We then analyze the capabilities of such an attacker and show that arbitrary longitude changes and receiver bias changes are possible. We consider potential data channels that can be used for this attack and conclude with a discussion on potential mitigations.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.S.

Level thesis:degree_level

Thesis

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Electrical & Computer Engr

Grantor

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2025

Author dc:creator

• Caglar, Deniz

Contributors dc:contributor

• Levchenko, Kirill Igorevich

• Gps
• Navigation
• Ephemeris
• Spoof

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2025 Deniz Caglar

Language dc:language

en, eng

Handle dc:identifier

https://hdl.handle.net/2142/129980

OAI record oai:identifier

https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=etdms&identifier=oai%3Awww.ideals.illinois.edu%3A2142%2F129980