Not all leaders are created equal: Strong leaders increase group cooperation

A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group cooperation. Yet, not all punishers are similarly effective. Here, we present evidence from a behavioral economic experiment that tests the effect of leader strength on follower cooperation. Results indicate that strong leaders with a more dominant reputation (acquired through their highly punitive history of behavior) significantly increase follower cooperation. This pattern emerged regardless of whether these strong leaders were (a) assigned to groups, (b) chosen by followers through bids, or (c) leading in times of intergroup competition. Altogether, these findings offer support to the notion that despite the greater costs they may inflict on followers, strong leaders are also able to bestow benefits on groups, which may explain why they are preferred in general and more intensely during times of dire need.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.S.

Level thesis:degree_level

Thesis

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Psychology

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2019

Author dc:creator

• Chen, Fan Xuan

Contributors dc:contributor

• Cheng, Joey T

• Cooperation
• Dominance
• Leadership
• Followership
• Competition
• Prestige
• Punishment
• Dominant Leaders
• Leadership Preference

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2019 Fan Xuan Chen

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105951

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105951