{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105951"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105951","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Not all leaders are created equal: Strong leaders increase group cooperation","abstract":"A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group cooperation. Yet, not all punishers are similarly effective. Here, we present evidence from a behavioral economic experiment that tests the effect of leader strength on follower cooperation. Results indicate that strong leaders with a more dominant reputation (acquired through their highly punitive history of behavior) significantly increase follower cooperation. This pattern emerged regardless of whether these strong leaders were (a) assigned to groups, (b) chosen by followers through bids, or (c) leading in times of intergroup competition. Altogether, these findings offer support to the notion that despite the greater costs they may inflict on followers, strong leaders are also able to bestow benefits on groups, which may explain why they are preferred in general and more intensely during times of dire need.","abstract_html":"A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group cooperation. Yet, not all punishers are similarly effective. Here, we present evidence from a behavioral economic experiment that tests the effect of leader strength on follower cooperation. Results indicate that strong leaders with a more dominant reputation (acquired through their highly punitive history of behavior) significantly increase follower cooperation. This pattern emerged regardless of whether these strong leaders were (a) assigned to groups, (b) chosen by followers through bids, or (c) leading in times of intergroup competition. Altogether, these findings offer support to the notion that despite the greater costs they may inflict on followers, strong leaders are also able to bestow benefits on groups, which may explain why they are preferred in general and more intensely during times of dire need.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Chen, Fan Xuan"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Cheng, Joey T"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-11-26T20:59:49Z","date_published":"2019-11-26T20:59:49Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:45Z","subjects":["Cooperation","Dominance","Leadership","Followership","Competition","Prestige","Punishment","Dominant Leaders","Leadership Preference"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2019 Fan Xuan Chen"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105951","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Cheng, Joey T"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Chen, Fan Xuan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-11-26T20:59:49Z","2021-11-27T10:15:23Z","2019-07-16","2019-08"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Cooperation","Dominance","Leadership","Followership","Competition","Prestige","Punishment","Dominant Leaders","Leadership Preference"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2019 Fan Xuan Chen"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105951"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group cooperation. Yet, not all punishers are similarly effective. Here, we present evidence from a behavioral economic experiment that tests the effect of leader strength on follower cooperation. Results indicate that strong leaders with a more dominant reputation (acquired through their highly punitive history of behavior) significantly increase follower cooperation. This pattern emerged regardless of whether these strong leaders were (a) assigned to groups, (b) chosen by followers through bids, or (c) leading in times of intergroup competition. Altogether, these findings offer support to the notion that despite the greater costs they may inflict on followers, strong leaders are also able to bestow benefits on groups, which may explain why they are preferred in general and more intensely during times of dire need.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'Closed Access', the embargo will last until 2021-08-01","The student, Fan Xuan Chen, accepted the attached license on 2019-07-15 at 15:43.","The student, Fan Xuan Chen, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2019-07-15 at 15:52.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2019-07-16 at 11:20.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14326 on 2019-11-26 at 14:04:17","Made available in DSpace on 2019-11-26T20:59:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 CHEN-THESIS-2019.pdf: 897992 bytes, checksum: c38904800cdcb588e27c6ada81596f03 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4210 bytes, checksum: 6a0eab3a4b400b1b1d6084bc97c1476d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-07-16","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 113098 Lift date: 2021-11-26T20:59:54Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Limited Restriction Lifted for Item 113098 on 2021-11-27T10:15:23Z."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Not all leaders are created equal: Strong leaders increase group cooperation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Cheng, Joey T"],"dc:creator":["Chen, Fan Xuan"],"dc:date":["2019-11-26T20:59:49Z","2021-11-27T10:15:23Z","2019-07-16","2019-08"],"dc:description":["A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group cooperation. Yet, not all punishers are similarly effective. Here, we present evidence from a behavioral economic experiment that tests the effect of leader strength on follower cooperation. Results indicate that strong leaders with a more dominant reputation (acquired through their highly punitive history of behavior) significantly increase follower cooperation. This pattern emerged regardless of whether these strong leaders were (a) assigned to groups, (b) chosen by followers through bids, or (c) leading in times of intergroup competition. Altogether, these findings offer support to the notion that despite the greater costs they may inflict on followers, strong leaders are also able to bestow benefits on groups, which may explain why they are preferred in general and more intensely during times of dire need.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'Closed Access', the embargo will last until 2021-08-01","The student, Fan Xuan Chen, accepted the attached license on 2019-07-15 at 15:43.","The student, Fan Xuan Chen, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2019-07-15 at 15:52.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2019-07-16 at 11:20.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14326 on 2019-11-26 at 14:04:17","Made available in DSpace on 2019-11-26T20:59:49Z (GMT). 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