Trace-based hardware control flow signature checking

Since the widespread adoption of the internet, computer security has become one of the primary concerns of computer systems engineers, who are often faced with a choice between increased performance and stronger security policies. Many advancements in computer security impose a performance penalty. One such advancement, control-flow integrity (CFI), offers immunity to code-reuse attacks but slows down software that enforces CFI. In this work, we present a hardware monitor design that utilizes hardware support for instruction tracing to detect code-reuse attacks. The monitor is small in hardware size, uses low power, and does not decrease software performance.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.S.

Level thesis:degree_level

Thesis

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Electrical & Computer Engr

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2018

Author dc:creator

• Clark, Eric James

Contributors dc:contributor

• Bailey, Michael D

• control-flow integrity
• code-reuse attack
• trace
• security
• ARM
• FPGA
• logic design

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2018 Eric James Clark

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/101830

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/101830