EXPLANATORY GAPS ABOUND: A DEFENCE OF PHYSICALISM AGAINST ARGUMENTS FROM EPISTEMIC CONTRAST

According to a popular line of thought, there is a special explanatory gap found in reductive explanations of the phenomenal in terms of the physical. In contrast, this explanatory gap is not found in paradigmatic reductive explanations. This special explanatory gap, which can be cashed out in terms of the lack of a priori entailment, is then thought to show that physicalism is false. Recently, however, Jonathan Schaffer has argued that there is no such contrast between paradigmatic reductive explanations and physicalistic reductive explanations of the phenomenal. Basically, Schaffer argues that the a priori openness of various metaphysical theses, such as mereological universalism, show that explanatory gaps are found everywhere in nature, even in paradigmatic reductive explanations. Some have responded by granting Schaffer’s argument that there is lack of a priori entailment in paradigmatic cases but argued that there is still a special explanatory gap in the phenomenal cases. In my thesis, I argue that none of these responses work to show a special explanatory gap in the phenomenal cases.

Author dc:creator

• CHIA ZHI HENG

• Physicalism
• The Explanatory Gap
• Metaphysics of Mind

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• https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/bitstreams/a813991c-e171-4098-a32e-fbee0189c0fd/download