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Showing 1 to 20 of 24 for “"Physicalism"”.
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Consciousness and Physicalism
<p>Physicalism is a philosophy of mind which attempts to explain consciousness as resulting from physical causes. The lack of a complete and consistent mathematical theory to explain physical causation has led other philosophers of mind to propose that consciousness is a nonphysical essence, …
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The content of physicalism
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1995.
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Essence, Revelation, and Physicalism
Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the …
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The Immediacy of Phenomenal Concepts and Immediate Implications for Physicalism
A number of recent objections to physicalism are based on the apparent gap between physical knowledge and phenomenal knowledge. In response, some physicalists accept the epistemic gap, but deny the inference from the epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap. One popular strategy is to argue that there …
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Physicalism, intentionality, mind : three studies in the philosophy of mind.
Thesis. 1977. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.
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EXPLANATORY GAPS ABOUND: A DEFENCE OF PHYSICALISM AGAINST ARGUMENTS FROM EPISTEMIC CONTRAST
… priori entailment, is then thought to show that physicalism is false. Recently, however, Jonathan Schaffer has argued that there is no such contrast between paradigmatic reductive explanations and physicalistic reductive explanations of the phenomenal. Basically, Schaffer argues that the a priori …
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Analysis in mind
… defenses of it are unsuccessful. For example, Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that every actual psychological event, property, or process is necessitated by some actual physical event, property, or process. Many philosophers believe that Physicalism is true. Until about the 1960s, those …
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Could consciousness be physically realised?
I defend physicalism about phenomenal consciousness against recent epistemic arguments for dualism. First I argue (as against Kripke) that psychophysical identities can be a posteriori (and apparently contingent, and conceivably false). Their epistemic status is due to the analytic independence of …
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The Tale of Mental Causation: Fact or Fiction?
… problem, more and more philosophers accept physicalism. However, it is surprising that the problem of mental causation arises again from the heart of physicalism. It means that accepting physicalist ontology does not make this problem go away. On the contrary, basic physical assumptions can …
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"Let Us Make 'adam": An Edenic Model of Personal Ontology
… briefly analyzes substance dualism and physicalism according to the rubrics of constitution and nature, using a model methodology. It then compares the advantages and challenges each offers, and asks whether a model based solely on the normative source of the biblical canon might prove …
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Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem: Why the Twenty-First Century Still Needs Mental Substances
… The present-day incarnation of materialism, physicalism, overtook substance dualism and idealism in the middle of the twentieth century to become the leading response to the mind-body problem. At the same time, substance dualism and idealism have become decidedly unpopular. Even present-day …
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What lies beneath? : a defense of categorical humility
… that Categorical Humility is incompatible with physicalism, at least as physicalism is often articulated. The second is that a certain meta-Humility thesis is true; namely, there's a fact of the matter about whether, say, dispositions are necessarily connected to their categorical bases, but we …
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Potency & Process: A Naturalistic Defense of Mental Causation
… philosophy of mind and neuroscience that physicalism precludes the possibility of robust mental causation. "Exclusion arguments" of the sort offered by Jaegwon Kim present the physicalist with an apparent dilemma: either all putatively "mental" causation reduces to mere "bottom-up" …
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Practical knowledge and abilities
… Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" against physicalism.
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Soul searching : an exploration of the relationship between technology and soul through the interpretation of contemporary visual texts
… things and events (Hornborg 2006:1). Finally, physicalism asserts that there is nothing more to the world than what can be scientifically and empirically observed (Pettit 1993:222). These three categories approaches to the soul and technology differ, but, as becomes evident in the analysis, …
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The conscious mind unified.
… argue against the three major naturalist views: physicalism, Russellian panpsychism, and emergentism. I develop various arguments demonstrating that these views each fail to account for the possibility of subjects of phenomenally unified consciousness. In the final chapter, I show how these …
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Techno-Salvation: Developing a Christian Hermeneutic of Enhancement Technology
… it means to be human the common positions of physicalism and substance dualism are shown wanting despite strong arguments in their favor. This project argues for a middle position – ensoulment – that attempts to take the best of both approaches but minimize their weaknesses. Likewise, this …
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Mind the Matter: Active Matter, Basal Cognition, and the Making of Bio-Inspired Artificial Intelligence
… conception of materiality as entailing reductive physicalism, we find that the above adumbrated disciplines are in fact conceptualising and operationalising notions of agency (and closely related notions of emergence and downward causation) that are both realist with regards to agency and …
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The realiser-realiser identity theory of mind
… in many versions than range from kinds of physicalism to kinds of idealism, but that these different versions do not change the way in which the realiser-realiser identity theory handles the problems mentioned above. In Chapter IV, I will compare the realiser-realiser identity theory with …
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