Free Will and Meaningful Action: Expressions of the Self

<p>Generally, this project defends a particular agent-causal interpretation of libertarian free will, as well as advocates for its indispensability in cultivating a meaningful life.</p> <p>In chapter one, I argue that libertarian free will enhances meaning in life. Determinism threatens meaning in life because under a deterministic universe, agents hold a strangely alien relationship with their actions. I argue that agent-causal libertarian free will, by way of origination, contributes to meaning in life because it alleviates this problem of alienation by securing a unique kind of self-expression, which I call “metaphysical self-expression,” and enhancing the value we obtain from what I call “personal self-expression.”</p> <p>In chapter two, I motivate the adoption of agent-causal theories in light of competing libertarian models (i.e., noncausal and event-causal). I argue that agent-causal theories are superior for grounding the enhanced meaning afforded by metaphysical self-expression because they have the strongest claim to origination, where this is due to their ability to secure control over our actions. In light of this claim, I distinguish between weak claims to origination (which all forms of libertarianism may share), and strong claims to origination, which I contend are secured by agent-causal libertarianism via control. I defend these claims by considering the popular luck objection. With it, I show how agent-causal commitments accommodate control, avoid luck, and therefore secure originative value. I conclude by reviewing other various objections against agent-causation.</p> <p>In chapter three, I defend a particular agent-causal model, coined by Helen Steward (2012), called “agency incompatibilism,” which assumes the power of agents to settle their fine- grained bodily movements. I defend her account from various contemporary critiques, and (once again) use the problem of luck as a heuristic to demonstrate the uniqueness of the theory. I argue that such a freedom, though it relies on a conception of action that is not at all times conscious or reflective, is still a kind of freedom worth wanting. I conclude by arguing there is a distinction in the agency incompatibilist literature, which implicitly admits two versions of the theory I call “lower-level agency incompatibilism” and “higher-level agency incompatibilism.” Making such a distinction and recognizing the compatibility of Steward’s (2012) view with more traditional agent-causal accounts allows for the construction of the ideal agency incompatibilist model.</p> <p>The fourth and final chapter provides a direct application of Steward’s (2012) theory in order to demonstrate the validity of the claims made in chapters one and two. With it, I show how artistic activity (one such aspect of human life which contributes to its meaningfulness) is made more meaningful when we posit this power to settle fine-grained bodily movements. More specifically, I construct a thought experiment that I call the expressive dancer and use it to illustrate how dance practice is made more meaningful when we posit this a metaphysical power. I then construct a more formal argument rooted in considerations regarding improvisation in the arts and consider the role that origination and spontaneity play in enhancing the perceived authenticity of an artist. I conclude by extending this sentiment to art practice generally and reflect on the role of the “body” in the arts.</p> <p>I conclude by observing important features of my framework. Namely, I remind us that my narrow meaning-incompatibilism is flexible and may accommodate a wide range of arguments that exist beyond the scope of the ASE. Finally, I reiterate the main line of argumentation and encourage free will theorists to reflect on the arguments at hand.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York

Year dc:date.available

2024

Author dc:creator

• Mendez, Alex J

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Miranda Fricker

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Benjamin Vilhauer
• Jonathan Gilmore

• Aesthetics
• Metaphysics
• Other Philosophy
• Free Will
• Libertarianism
• Origination
• Meaning in Life
• Philosophy of Dance
• Self-Expression

Repository record dc:identifier

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6073

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:academicworks.cuny.edu:gc_etds-7168