Generally, this project defends a particular agent-causal interpretation of libertarian free will, as well as advocates for its indispensability in cultivating a meaningful life.
In chapter one, I argue that libertarian free will enhances meaning in life. Determinism threatens meaning in life because under a deterministic universe, agents hold a strangely alien relationship with their actions. I argue that agent-causal libertarian free will, by way of origination, contributes to meaning in life because it alleviates this problem of alienation by securing a unique kind of self-expression, which I call “metaphysical self-expression,” and enhancing the value we obtain from what I call “personal self-expression.”
In chapter two, I motivate the adoption of agent-causal theories in light of competing libertarian models (i.e., noncausal and event-causal). I argue that agent-causal theories are superior for grounding the enhanced meaning afforded by metaphysical self-expression because they have the strongest claim to origination, where this is due to their ability to secure control over our actions. In light of this claim, I distinguish between weak claims to origination (which all forms of libertarianism may share), and strong claims to origination, which I contend are secured by agent-causal libertarianism via control. I defend these claims by considering the popular luck objection. With it, I show how agent-causal commitments accommodate control, avoid luck, and therefore secure originative value. I conclude by reviewing other various objections against agent-causation.
In chapter three, I defend a particular agent-causal model, coined by Helen Steward (2012), called “agency incompatibilism,” which assumes the power of agents to settle their fine- grained bodily movements. I defend her account from various contemporary critiques, and (once again) use the problem of luck as a heuristic to demonstrate the uniqueness of the theory. I argue that such a freedom, though it relies on a conception of action that is not at all times conscious or reflective, is still a kind of freedom worth wanting. I conclude by arguing there is a distinction in the agency incompatibilist literature, which implicitly admits two versions of the theory I call “lower-level agency incompatibilism” and “higher-level agency incompatibilism.” Making such a distinction and recognizing the compatibility of Steward’s (2012) view with more traditional agent-causal accounts allows for the construction of the ideal agency incompatibilist model.
The fourth and final chapter provides a direct application of Steward’s (2012) theory in order to demonstrate the validity of the claims made in chapters one and two. With it, I show how artistic activity (one such aspect of human life which contributes to its meaningfulness) is made more meaningful when we posit this power to settle fine-grained bodily movements. More specifically, I construct a thought experiment that I call the expressive dancer and use it to illustrate how dance practice is made more meaningful when we posit this a metaphysical power. I then construct a more formal argument rooted in considerations regarding improvisation in the arts and consider the role that origination and spontaneity play in enhancing the perceived authenticity of an artist. I conclude by extending this sentiment to art practice generally and reflect on the role of the “body” in the arts.
I conclude by observing important features of my framework. Namely, I remind us that my narrow meaning-incompatibilism is flexible and may accommodate a wide range of arguments that exist beyond the scope of the ASE. Finally, I reiterate the main line of argumentation and encourage free will theorists to reflect on the arguments at hand.
","abstract_html":"<p>Generally, this project defends a particular agent-causal interpretation of libertarian free will, as well as advocates for its indispensability in cultivating a meaningful life.</p> <p>In chapter one, I argue that libertarian free will enhances meaning in life. Determinism threatens meaning in life because under a deterministic universe, agents hold a strangely alien relationship with their actions. I argue that agent-causal libertarian free will, by way of origination, contributes to meaning in life because it alleviates this problem of alienation by securing a unique kind of self-expression, which I call “metaphysical self-expression,” and enhancing the value we obtain from what I call “personal self-expression.”</p> <p>In chapter two, I motivate the adoption of agent-causal theories in light of competing libertarian models (i.e., noncausal and event-causal). I argue that agent-causal theories are superior for grounding the enhanced meaning afforded by metaphysical self-expression because they have the strongest claim to origination, where this is due to their ability to secure control over our actions. In light of this claim, I distinguish between weak claims to origination (which all forms of libertarianism may share), and strong claims to origination, which I contend are secured by agent-causal libertarianism via control. I defend these claims by considering the popular luck objection. With it, I show how agent-causal commitments accommodate control, avoid luck, and therefore secure originative value. I conclude by reviewing other various objections against agent-causation.</p> <p>In chapter three, I defend a particular agent-causal model, coined by Helen Steward (2012), called “agency incompatibilism,” which assumes the power of agents to settle their fine- grained bodily movements. I defend her account from various contemporary critiques, and (once again) use the problem of luck as a heuristic to demonstrate the uniqueness of the theory. I argue that such a freedom, though it relies on a conception of action that is not at all times conscious or reflective, is still a kind of freedom worth wanting. I conclude by arguing there is a distinction in the agency incompatibilist literature, which implicitly admits two versions of the theory I call “lower-level agency incompatibilism” and “higher-level agency incompatibilism.” Making such a distinction and recognizing the compatibility of Steward’s (2012) view with more traditional agent-causal accounts allows for the construction of the ideal agency incompatibilist model.</p> <p>The fourth and final chapter provides a direct application of Steward’s (2012) theory in order to demonstrate the validity of the claims made in chapters one and two. With it, I show how artistic activity (one such aspect of human life which contributes to its meaningfulness) is made more meaningful when we posit this power to settle fine-grained bodily movements. More specifically, I construct a thought experiment that I call the expressive dancer and use it to illustrate how dance practice is made more meaningful when we posit this a metaphysical power. I then construct a more formal argument rooted in considerations regarding improvisation in the arts and consider the role that origination and spontaneity play in enhancing the perceived authenticity of an artist. I conclude by extending this sentiment to art practice generally and reflect on the role of the “body” in the arts.</p> <p>I conclude by observing important features of my framework. Namely, I remind us that my narrow meaning-incompatibilism is flexible and may accommodate a wide range of arguments that exist beyond the scope of the ASE. Finally, I reiterate the main line of argumentation and encourage free will theorists to reflect on the arguments at hand.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Mendez, Alex J"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Miranda Fricker"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Benjamin Vilhauer","Jonathan Gilmore"],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-09-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-09-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:58:57Z","subjects":["Aesthetics","Metaphysics","Other Philosophy","Free Will","Libertarianism","Origination","Meaning in Life","Philosophy of Dance","Self-Expression"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6073","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Miranda Fricker"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Benjamin Vilhauer","Jonathan Gilmore"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Mendez, Alex J"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-09-30T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Aesthetics","Metaphysics","Other Philosophy","Free Will","Libertarianism","Origination","Meaning in Life","Philosophy of Dance","Self-Expression"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6073"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Generally, this project defends a particular agent-causal interpretation of libertarian free will, as well as advocates for its indispensability in cultivating a meaningful life.
In chapter one, I argue that libertarian free will enhances meaning in life. Determinism threatens meaning in life because under a deterministic universe, agents hold a strangely alien relationship with their actions. I argue that agent-causal libertarian free will, by way of origination, contributes to meaning in life because it alleviates this problem of alienation by securing a unique kind of self-expression, which I call “metaphysical self-expression,” and enhancing the value we obtain from what I call “personal self-expression.”
In chapter two, I motivate the adoption of agent-causal theories in light of competing libertarian models (i.e., noncausal and event-causal). I argue that agent-causal theories are superior for grounding the enhanced meaning afforded by metaphysical self-expression because they have the strongest claim to origination, where this is due to their ability to secure control over our actions. In light of this claim, I distinguish between weak claims to origination (which all forms of libertarianism may share), and strong claims to origination, which I contend are secured by agent-causal libertarianism via control. I defend these claims by considering the popular luck objection. With it, I show how agent-causal commitments accommodate control, avoid luck, and therefore secure originative value. I conclude by reviewing other various objections against agent-causation.
In chapter three, I defend a particular agent-causal model, coined by Helen Steward (2012), called “agency incompatibilism,” which assumes the power of agents to settle their fine- grained bodily movements. I defend her account from various contemporary critiques, and (once again) use the problem of luck as a heuristic to demonstrate the uniqueness of the theory. I argue that such a freedom, though it relies on a conception of action that is not at all times conscious or reflective, is still a kind of freedom worth wanting. I conclude by arguing there is a distinction in the agency incompatibilist literature, which implicitly admits two versions of the theory I call “lower-level agency incompatibilism” and “higher-level agency incompatibilism.” Making such a distinction and recognizing the compatibility of Steward’s (2012) view with more traditional agent-causal accounts allows for the construction of the ideal agency incompatibilist model.
The fourth and final chapter provides a direct application of Steward’s (2012) theory in order to demonstrate the validity of the claims made in chapters one and two. With it, I show how artistic activity (one such aspect of human life which contributes to its meaningfulness) is made more meaningful when we posit this power to settle fine-grained bodily movements. More specifically, I construct a thought experiment that I call the expressive dancer and use it to illustrate how dance practice is made more meaningful when we posit this a metaphysical power. I then construct a more formal argument rooted in considerations regarding improvisation in the arts and consider the role that origination and spontaneity play in enhancing the perceived authenticity of an artist. I conclude by extending this sentiment to art practice generally and reflect on the role of the “body” in the arts.
I conclude by observing important features of my framework. Namely, I remind us that my narrow meaning-incompatibilism is flexible and may accommodate a wide range of arguments that exist beyond the scope of the ASE. Finally, I reiterate the main line of argumentation and encourage free will theorists to reflect on the arguments at hand.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Free Will and Meaningful Action: Expressions of the Self"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Miranda Fricker"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Benjamin Vilhauer","Jonathan Gilmore"],"dc:creator":["Mendez, Alex J"],"dc:date.available":["2026-09-30T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Generally, this project defends a particular agent-causal interpretation of libertarian free will, as well as advocates for its indispensability in cultivating a meaningful life.
In chapter one, I argue that libertarian free will enhances meaning in life. Determinism threatens meaning in life because under a deterministic universe, agents hold a strangely alien relationship with their actions. I argue that agent-causal libertarian free will, by way of origination, contributes to meaning in life because it alleviates this problem of alienation by securing a unique kind of self-expression, which I call “metaphysical self-expression,” and enhancing the value we obtain from what I call “personal self-expression.”
In chapter two, I motivate the adoption of agent-causal theories in light of competing libertarian models (i.e., noncausal and event-causal). I argue that agent-causal theories are superior for grounding the enhanced meaning afforded by metaphysical self-expression because they have the strongest claim to origination, where this is due to their ability to secure control over our actions. In light of this claim, I distinguish between weak claims to origination (which all forms of libertarianism may share), and strong claims to origination, which I contend are secured by agent-causal libertarianism via control. I defend these claims by considering the popular luck objection. With it, I show how agent-causal commitments accommodate control, avoid luck, and therefore secure originative value. I conclude by reviewing other various objections against agent-causation.
In chapter three, I defend a particular agent-causal model, coined by Helen Steward (2012), called “agency incompatibilism,” which assumes the power of agents to settle their fine- grained bodily movements. I defend her account from various contemporary critiques, and (once again) use the problem of luck as a heuristic to demonstrate the uniqueness of the theory. I argue that such a freedom, though it relies on a conception of action that is not at all times conscious or reflective, is still a kind of freedom worth wanting. I conclude by arguing there is a distinction in the agency incompatibilist literature, which implicitly admits two versions of the theory I call “lower-level agency incompatibilism” and “higher-level agency incompatibilism.” Making such a distinction and recognizing the compatibility of Steward’s (2012) view with more traditional agent-causal accounts allows for the construction of the ideal agency incompatibilist model.
The fourth and final chapter provides a direct application of Steward’s (2012) theory in order to demonstrate the validity of the claims made in chapters one and two. With it, I show how artistic activity (one such aspect of human life which contributes to its meaningfulness) is made more meaningful when we posit this power to settle fine-grained bodily movements. More specifically, I construct a thought experiment that I call the expressive dancer and use it to illustrate how dance practice is made more meaningful when we posit this a metaphysical power. I then construct a more formal argument rooted in considerations regarding improvisation in the arts and consider the role that origination and spontaneity play in enhancing the perceived authenticity of an artist. I conclude by extending this sentiment to art practice generally and reflect on the role of the “body” in the arts.
I conclude by observing important features of my framework. Namely, I remind us that my narrow meaning-incompatibilism is flexible and may accommodate a wide range of arguments that exist beyond the scope of the ASE. Finally, I reiterate the main line of argumentation and encourage free will theorists to reflect on the arguments at hand.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6073"],"dc:subject":["Aesthetics","Metaphysics","Other Philosophy","Free Will","Libertarianism","Origination","Meaning in Life","Philosophy of Dance","Self-Expression"],"dc:title":["Free Will and Meaningful Action: Expressions of the Self"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:58:57Z"}