Abstract
dc:description.abstractMy dissertation articulates and resolves a problem at the heart of debates about how perception guides our actions and deliberations. The problem arises from the independent plausibility but mutual inconsistency of the following theses: * Some perceptions provide us reasons * Only belief-like states provide us reasons * No perception is belief-like I argue that this problem is deeper than has been acknowledged. Simply rejecting any one thesis leads to serious challenges. Nonetheless, I argue that we can unravel the link between having reasons and having belief-like states in a way that explains the initial plausibility of the first thesis. I provide a formulation of what being a reason-giving state amounts to, which does not require it to be belief-like. I then offer a substantive account of perceptual content that both respects its non-belief-like: nonconceptual) character and explains its ability to provide us reasons.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology
- Year dc:date.available
- 2010
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Cahen, Arnon
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- José Luis Bermúdez
Subjects
dc:subject × 7Rights
- Language dc:language
- English (en)
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:etd-1050