{"id":{"repo_id":"wustl","oai_identifier":"oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:etd-1050"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/wustl/oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:etd-1050","repository":{"repo_id":"wustl","name":"Washington University in St. Louis","base_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Perception and Nonconceptual Apprehension","abstract":"My dissertation articulates and resolves a problem at the heart of debates about how perception guides our actions and deliberations. The problem arises from the independent plausibility but mutual inconsistency of the following theses: * Some perceptions provide us reasons * Only belief-like states provide us reasons * No perception is belief-like I argue that this problem is deeper than has been acknowledged. Simply rejecting any one thesis leads to serious challenges. Nonetheless, I argue that we can unravel the link between having reasons and having belief-like states in a way that explains the initial plausibility of the first thesis. I provide a formulation of what being a reason-giving state amounts to, which does not require it to be belief-like. I then offer a substantive account of perceptual content that both respects its non-belief-like: nonconceptual) character and explains its ability to provide us reasons.","abstract_html":"My dissertation articulates and resolves a problem at the heart of debates about how perception guides our actions and deliberations. The problem arises from the independent plausibility but mutual inconsistency of the following theses: * Some perceptions provide us reasons * Only belief-like states provide us reasons * No perception is belief-like I argue that this problem is deeper than has been acknowledged. Simply rejecting any one thesis leads to serious challenges. Nonetheless, I argue that we can unravel the link between having reasons and having belief-like states in a way that explains the initial plausibility of the first thesis. I provide a formulation of what being a reason-giving state amounts to, which does not require it to be belief-like. I then offer a substantive account of perceptual content that both respects its non-belief-like: nonconceptual) character and explains its ability to provide us reasons.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Cahen, Arnon"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["José Luis Bermúdez"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2010,"date_issued":"2010-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2010-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:13:14Z","subjects":["Philosophy","Cognition","Epistemology","Mental Content","Nonconceptual","Perception","Reasons"],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H","href":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/51","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["José Luis Bermúdez"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Cahen, Arnon"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2010-01-01T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","Cognition","Epistemology","Mental Content","Nonconceptual","Perception","Reasons"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/51"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["My dissertation articulates and resolves a problem at the heart of debates about how perception guides our actions and deliberations. 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Nonetheless, I argue that we can unravel the link between having reasons and having belief-like states in a way that explains the initial plausibility of the first thesis. I provide a formulation of what being a reason-giving state amounts to, which does not require it to be belief-like. I then offer a substantive account of perceptual content that both respects its non-belief-like: nonconceptual) character and explains its ability to provide us reasons."],"dc:identifier":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/51"],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H"],"dc:language":["English (en)"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy","Cognition","Epistemology","Mental Content","Nonconceptual","Perception","Reasons"],"dc:title":["Perception and Nonconceptual Apprehension"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:13:14Z"}