Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn this paper, I argue that pluralism about material constitution (i.e., holding that the relata of constitution can be non-identical) is a theoretically useful notion. First, I propose a principle whose denial is sufficient and, to my knowledge, necessary for pluralism to be true. Then I formulate three metaphysical antinomies (the problem of material constitution, the problem of change, and the problem of many) in such a way as to reveal that the previous principle is involved in all three. Then I show that the denial of the principle resolves all three of these problems. Finally, I conclude that pluralism is indeed theoretically useful on the basis of the following three points: 1) denying the mentioned principle is sufficient for pluralism to be correct, 2) denying the principle resolves three problems, and 3) by a theoretically useful notion I mean that if it were true it would solve multiple problems.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Arts
- Level thesis:degree_level
- masters
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Department dc:contributor.department
- Philosophy
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Virginia Tech
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2017
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Davies, Morgan Edward
- Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
-
- Trogdon, Kelly Griffith
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Klagge, James C.
- Parent, Ted
- Patton, Lydia K.
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- In Copyright
- Licence dc:rights.uri
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Other
- vt_gsexam:11340
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/86142