{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/86142"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/86142","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Theoretical Usefulness of Pluralistic Constitution Theory","abstract":"In this paper, I argue that pluralism about material constitution (i.e., holding that the relata of constitution can be non-identical) is a theoretically useful notion. First, I propose a principle whose denial is sufficient and, to my knowledge, necessary for pluralism to be true. Then I formulate three metaphysical antinomies (the problem of material constitution, the problem of change, and the problem of many) in such a way as to reveal that the previous principle is involved in all three. Then I show that the denial of the principle resolves all three of these problems. Finally, I conclude that pluralism is indeed theoretically useful on the basis of the following three points: 1) denying the mentioned principle is sufficient for pluralism to be correct, 2) denying the principle resolves three problems, and 3) by a theoretically useful notion I mean that if it were true it would solve multiple problems.","abstract_html":"In this paper, I argue that pluralism about material constitution (i.e., holding that the relata of constitution can be non-identical) is a theoretically useful notion. First, I propose a principle whose denial is sufficient and, to my knowledge, necessary for pluralism to be true. Then I formulate three metaphysical antinomies (the problem of material constitution, the problem of change, and the problem of many) in such a way as to reveal that the previous principle is involved in all three. Then I show that the denial of the principle resolves all three of these problems. Finally, I conclude that pluralism is indeed theoretically useful on the basis of the following three points: 1) denying the mentioned principle is sufficient for pluralism to be correct, 2) denying the principle resolves three problems, and 3) by a theoretically useful notion I mean that if it were true it would solve multiple problems.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Davies, Morgan Edward"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"committee_members":["Klagge, James C.","Parent, Ted","Patton, Lydia K."],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-05-31","date_published":"2017-05-31","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:18:57Z","subjects":["Metaphysics","Material Constitution"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:11340"],"render_values":[{"text":"vt_gsexam:11340","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/86142","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Klagge, James C.","Parent, Ted","Patton, Lydia K."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Davies, Morgan Edward"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2018-11-23T07:00:41Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2018-11-23T07:00:41Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2017-05-31"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Metaphysics","Material Constitution"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:11340"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/86142"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this paper, I argue that pluralism about material constitution (i.e., holding that the relata of constitution can be non-identical) is a theoretically useful notion. First, I propose a principle whose denial is sufficient and, to my knowledge, necessary for pluralism to be true. Then I formulate three metaphysical antinomies (the problem of material constitution, the problem of change, and the problem of many) in such a way as to reveal that the previous principle is involved in all three. Then I show that the denial of the principle resolves all three of these problems. Finally, I conclude that pluralism is indeed theoretically useful on the basis of the following three points: 1) denying the mentioned principle is sufficient for pluralism to be correct, 2) denying the principle resolves three problems, and 3) by a theoretically useful notion I mean that if it were true it would solve multiple problems."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstractgeneral","label":"General Abstract","values":["There is a debate in philosophy about whether or not objects are identical to what makes them up. This paper argues that if we are to assume objects are not identical to what makes them up then many problems that have be written about in the literature dissipate. Thus, it is useful to believe that objects are not identical to what makes them up."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["ETD"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Theoretical Usefulness of Pluralistic Constitution Theory"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Klagge, James C.","Parent, Ted","Patton, Lydia K."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Davies, Morgan Edward"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2018-11-23T07:00:41Z"],"dc:date.available":["2018-11-23T07:00:41Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2017-05-31"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this paper, I argue that pluralism about material constitution (i.e., holding that the relata of constitution can be non-identical) is a theoretically useful notion. 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This paper argues that if we are to assume objects are not identical to what makes them up then many problems that have be written about in the literature dissipate. Thus, it is useful to believe that objects are not identical to what makes them up."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts"],"dc:format.medium":["ETD"],"dc:identifier.other":["vt_gsexam:11340"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/86142"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Metaphysics","Material Constitution"],"dc:title":["The Theoretical Usefulness of Pluralistic Constitution Theory"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:18:57Z"}