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Virginia Tech

Thwarting Electromagnetic Fault Injection Attack Utilizing Timing Attack Countermeasure

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The extent of embedded systems' role in modern life has continuously increased over the years. Moreover, embedded systems are assuming highly critical functions with security requirements more than ever before. Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) is an efficient class of physical attacks that can compromise the immunity of secure cryptographic algorithms. Despite successful EMFI attacks, the effects of electromagnetic injection on a processor are not well understood. This includes lack of solid knowledge about how EMFI affects the circuit and deviates it from proper functionality. Also, effects of EM glitches on the global networks of a chip such as power, clock and reset network are not known. We believe to properly model EMFI and develop effective countermeasures, a deeper understanding of the EM effect on a chip is needed. In this thesis, we present a bottom-up analysis of EMFI effects on a RISC microprocessor. We study these effects at three levels: at the wire-level, at the chip-network level, and at the gate-level considering parameters such as EM-injection location and timing. We conclude that EMFI induces local timing errors implying current timing attack detection and prevention techniques can be adapted to overcome EMFI. To further validate our hypothesis, we integrate a configurable timing sensor into our microprocessor to evaluate its effectiveness against EMFI.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Engineering
Department dc:contributor.department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
Virginia Tech
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ghodrati, Marjan
Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
  • Nazhandali, Leyla
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Abbott, A. Lynn
  • Schaumont, Patrick R.

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
vt_gsexam:14087
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/81906

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Tech
Base URL
vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Ghodrati, Marjan. Thwarting Electromagnetic Fault Injection Attack Utilizing Timing Attack Countermeasure. masters thesis, Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/81906