Does Selectorate Size Matter?: How the selectorate size of authoritarian regimes impacts trade levels

States are currently experiencing an increase in autocratization and support for authoritarian leaders and policies. This change in domestic politics can impact states' interactions in the international system. One of the changes that may be observed in state behavior is the willingness of states to participate in international trade, which can result in external influence. However, trade can also create economic growth and stability. As a result, increasing trade can become a popular policy in the eyes of elites and the masses. Thus, authoritarian leaders must consider how their options impact their ability to maintain power. I examine whether the size of the group that can determine whether the leader maintains power (their selectorate) is a determining factor in authoritarian states increasing their trade. Upon running a Generalized Least Squares regression, I conclude that when controlling for autocorrelation there is not a significant correlation between selectorate size and trade levels.

Level thesis:degree_level

M.A.

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• Gleason, Sarah

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Ostergard, Robert L.

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Martin, Susanne
• de Jong, Greta

• Authoritarian
• Authoritarian regime types
• Selectorate Theory
• Trade

Language dc:language.iso

en_US, English

Repository record dc:identifier.uri

https://scholarwolf.unr.edu/handle/11714/11446

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarwolf.unr.edu:11714/11446