{"id":{"repo_id":"unr","oai_identifier":"oai:scholarwolf.unr.edu:11714/11446"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/unr/oai:scholarwolf.unr.edu:11714/11446","repository":{"repo_id":"unr","name":"University of Nevada - Reno","base_url":"https://scholarwolf.unr.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Does Selectorate Size Matter?: How the selectorate size of authoritarian regimes impacts trade levels","abstract":"States are currently experiencing an increase in autocratization and support for authoritarian leaders and policies. This change in domestic politics can impact states' interactions in the international system. One of the changes that may be observed in state behavior is the willingness of states to participate in international trade, which can result in external influence. However, trade can also create economic growth and stability. As a result, increasing trade can become a popular policy in the eyes of elites and the masses. Thus, authoritarian leaders must consider how their options impact their ability to maintain power. I examine whether the size of the group that can determine whether the leader maintains power (their selectorate) is a determining factor in authoritarian states increasing their trade. Upon running a Generalized Least Squares regression, I conclude that when controlling for autocorrelation there is not a significant correlation between selectorate size and trade levels.","abstract_html":"States are currently experiencing an increase in autocratization and support for authoritarian leaders and policies. This change in domestic politics can impact states' interactions in the international system. One of the changes that may be observed in state behavior is the willingness of states to participate in international trade, which can result in external influence. However, trade can also create economic growth and stability. As a result, increasing trade can become a popular policy in the eyes of elites and the masses. Thus, authoritarian leaders must consider how their options impact their ability to maintain power. I examine whether the size of the group that can determine whether the leader maintains power (their selectorate) is a determining factor in authoritarian states increasing their trade. Upon running a Generalized Least Squares regression, I conclude that when controlling for autocorrelation there is not a significant correlation between selectorate size and trade levels.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gleason, Sarah"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":"M.A.","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Ostergard, Robert L."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Martin, Susanne","de Jong, Greta"],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025","date_published":"2025","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:47:58Z","subjects":["Authoritarian","Authoritarian regime types","Selectorate Theory","Trade"],"languages":["en_US","English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarwolf.unr.edu/handle/11714/11446","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Ostergard, Robert L."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Martin, Susanne","de Jong, Greta"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gleason, Sarah"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2025-07-02T18:50:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2025-07-02T18:50:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["M.A."]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["M.A."]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Authoritarian","Authoritarian regime types","Selectorate Theory","Trade"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://scholarwolf.unr.edu/handle/11714/11446"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["States are currently experiencing an increase in autocratization and support for authoritarian leaders and policies. This change in domestic politics can impact states' interactions in the international system. One of the changes that may be observed in state behavior is the willingness of states to participate in international trade, which can result in external influence. However, trade can also create economic growth and stability. As a result, increasing trade can become a popular policy in the eyes of elites and the masses. Thus, authoritarian leaders must consider how their options impact their ability to maintain power. I examine whether the size of the group that can determine whether the leader maintains power (their selectorate) is a determining factor in authoritarian states increasing their trade. Upon running a Generalized Least Squares regression, I conclude that when controlling for autocorrelation there is not a significant correlation between selectorate size and trade levels."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["PDF"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Does Selectorate Size Matter?: How the selectorate size of authoritarian regimes impacts trade levels"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Ostergard, Robert L."],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Martin, Susanne","de Jong, Greta"],"dc:creator":["Gleason, Sarah"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2025-07-02T18:50:35Z"],"dc:date.available":["2025-07-02T18:50:35Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2025"],"dc:description.abstract":["States are currently experiencing an increase in autocratization and support for authoritarian leaders and policies. This change in domestic politics can impact states' interactions in the international system. One of the changes that may be observed in state behavior is the willingness of states to participate in international trade, which can result in external influence. However, trade can also create economic growth and stability. As a result, increasing trade can become a popular policy in the eyes of elites and the masses. Thus, authoritarian leaders must consider how their options impact their ability to maintain power. I examine whether the size of the group that can determine whether the leader maintains power (their selectorate) is a determining factor in authoritarian states increasing their trade. Upon running a Generalized Least Squares regression, I conclude that when controlling for autocorrelation there is not a significant correlation between selectorate size and trade levels."],"dc:format":["PDF"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://scholarwolf.unr.edu/handle/11714/11446"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:subject":["Authoritarian","Authoritarian regime types","Selectorate Theory","Trade"],"dc:title":["Does Selectorate Size Matter?: How the selectorate size of authoritarian regimes impacts trade levels"],"dc:type":["M.A."],"thesis:degree_level":["M.A."]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:47:58Z"}