Matters of character

Notions of character are central to both normative and applied ethics. Over the past 15 years or so, a growing number of philosophers have advanced empirically-based critiques of virtue ethics, arguing for skepticism about character. I show how standard approaches to virtue ethics can be modified so as to avoid these rather damaging empirical critiques. The most promising responses to character skepticism, however, are not always available to virtue ethical approaches to applied ethics. In particular, I argue that virtue ethical approaches to business ethics are in need of novel responses to character skepticism or radical revision.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2016

Author dc:creator

• Spino, Joseph Michael

Contributors dc:contributor

• Moore, Michael
• Murphy, Colleen
• Doris, John
• Livengood, Jonathan

• Moral Psychology
• Virtue Ethics
• Situationism

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2016 Joseph Michael Spino

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/90762

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/90762