Nothing to disagree about: Aristotle, Newton, and the existence of void as seen through a Kuhnian lens

In this work, I argue that a doctrine of theoretic incommensurability, something like that offered by Thomas Kuhn, can be used to to explain the disagreement between Aristotle and Isaac Newton regarding the existence of void. A significant portion of the work is directed at identifying Kuhn’s mature conception of theoretic incommensurability and at diagnosing an apparently serious problem with the account, namely its susceptibility to the charge of epistemological relativism. To combat the charge, I develop an ontology and theory of cognition that can support the Kuhnian thesis without requiring one who prefers the view to accept a strong form of scientific relativism (i.e., scientific subjectivism). Nonetheless, enough conceptual freedom is left to substantiate the incommensurability thesis. Once I have shown that Kuhn's conception is sustainable, I put the theory into action. First, I present the views of both Aristotle and Newton on the existence of void. Then, I show that they diverge in exactly the way that leads to incommensurability according to the Kuhnian account. The end result is that both Aristotle and Newton are shown to have empirically acceptable positions even though they disagree.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2016

Author dc:creator

• Hegger, Ian Michael

Contributors dc:contributor

• Arana, Andrew
• Weinberg, Shelley
• Waskan, Jonathan
• Livengood, Jonathan

• Kuhn
• Incommensurability
• Scientific idealism
• Non-antirealism
• Aristotle
• Newton
• Void

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2016 Ian Hegger

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/90499

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/90499