Backchannel policymaking: members of Congress pursuing policy goals through the bureaucracy

This dissertation explores how individual members of Congress pursue policy goals by engaging with the bureaucracy. This behavior, which I call “backchannel policymaking”, is a new way of thinking about policymaking and representational behavior, distinct from previously studied channels of the lawmaking process like roll call votes or bill introductions. I develop and test a theory to explain why members of Congress choose to engage with the bureaucracy. I consider whether backchannel policymaking serves as an alternative path for policy influence, which members of Congress use to circumvent the legislative process. My analyses, which focus on senators’ policy contact with the bureaucracy during the 110th and the 111th Congresses and draw on original bureaucratic records from the U.S. Departments of Labor and Homeland Security, reveal that a senator’s institutional position, constraints, and behavior within the legislative process predict her engagement in backchannel policymaking. These findings illustrate how members of Congress try to influence policy outside of the formal lawmaking process.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Political Science

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2016

Author dc:creator

• Ritchie, Melinda Nell

Contributors dc:contributor

• Sulkin, Tracy
• Kuklinski, James
• Gaines, Brian
• Sin, Gisela

• Congress
• Bureaucracy

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2015 Melinda Ritchie

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89265

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/89265