University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Modeling the Bargaining Game Between Multinational Firms and Britain's Office of Fair Trading: An Exploratory Analysis
Abstract
dc:descriptionFew cases actually reach the MMC. The expense and intrusiveness of inquiries for both the target firms and the government lead to expectations that bargaining is preferred. Case histories of OFT and MMC decisions are reconstructed in order to determine why a negotiated settlement was or was not reached early on. These case histories of specific mergers illustrate how either corporate or agency strategy can influence the decision to pursue a case through the entire regulatory framework.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Kryda, Georgine Marie
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Hennart, Jean-Francois
- Roehl, Thomas
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (MiAaPQ)AAI9812662
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87895