Back to results

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Modeling the Bargaining Game Between Multinational Firms and Britain's Office of Fair Trading: An Exploratory Analysis

Abstract

dc:description

Few cases actually reach the MMC. The expense and intrusiveness of inquiries for both the target firms and the government lead to expectations that bargaining is preferred. Case histories of OFT and MMC decisions are reconstructed in order to determine why a negotiated settlement was or was not reached early on. These case histories of specific mergers illustrate how either corporate or agency strategy can influence the decision to pursue a case through the entire regulatory framework.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph.D.
Level thesis:degree_level
Dissertation
Grantor
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Year dc:date
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Kryda, Georgine Marie
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Hennart, Jean-Francois
  • Roehl, Thomas

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
(MiAaPQ)AAI9812662
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87895

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign
Base URL
www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Kryda, Georgine Marie. Modeling the Bargaining Game Between Multinational Firms and Britain's Office of Fair Trading: An Exploratory Analysis. Dissertation thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87895