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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Risking Belief: A Bayesian Decision Theoretic Epistemology

Abstract

dc:description

Finally, I apply BTRA to burden of proof and methodological naturalism, arguing that BTRA explicates burden of proof, and that methodological naturalism is only rational for people with certain practical and epistemic preferences: those with humanist tendencies.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph.D.
Level thesis:degree_level
Dissertation
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Year dc:date
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Sargent, Mark E.
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Maher, Patrick

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
(MiAaPQ)AAI3270017
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87601

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign
Base URL
www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Sargent, Mark E.. Risking Belief: A Bayesian Decision Theoretic Epistemology. Dissertation thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87601