Abstract
dc:description"Some mathematical terms are commonly taken by mathematicians, historians of mathematics, and ordinary speakers to co-refer with other mathematical terms even when each is embedded in a theory which predicates distinct properties of said referents. In this dissertation a picture of reference for such terms is set forth and defended which can make sense of such ordinary attributions of co-reference. It is argued that if one understands the perceivable structural properties of physical objects as mathematical entities, such properties can play the role of semantic anchors in the context of a hybrid internal-external (""descriptive""-""causal"") theory of reference. The conditions under which two terms dominantly associated with such properties co-refer are developed, and it is argued that actual cases of co-reference which are not tractable on a structuralist approach meet these conditions. The ontological claim that some mathematical objects are perceivable structural properties of physical objects and the general semantic viewpoint of the dissertation are also given independent defense."
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Stidd, Sean Charles
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Timothy McCarthy
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (MiAaPQ)AAI3243004
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87598