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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Simulations of Merger -Induced Price Changes in Hospital Markets
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe remainder of this dissertation models the effects of increasing managed care penetration on the incentive for hospitals to merge. The typical hospital market is modeled as a logit oligopoly. An implication of the model is that the incentive for hospitals to merge rises as the managed care penetration in their market increases.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Kautter, John Michael, Jr
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Cory S. Capps
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (MiAaPQ)AAI9990037
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85675