Abstract
dc:descriptionThe second chapter considers an auctioneer faced with a decision as whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction rule there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated for a given bidder. In this situation both Vickrey auction and first-price auction yield the same expected revenue and the analysis is unchanged across revenue equivalent auction rules.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Chakraborty, Indranil
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
- Charles Kahn
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (MiAaPQ)AAI9737068
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85610