Three Essays on Social Networks

Finally I present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labor supply where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers in a social network. In addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals labor supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g. wheel, complete) feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g. star, empty). Average income may be non-monotonic in tax enforcement.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• O'dea, Dennis Charles

Contributors dc:contributor

• Williams, Steven R.

• Economics, Theory

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3455776

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85601