Political Economy of Immigration and Lobbying

"In the second chapter, I develop a theoretical model of competition for immigrants between different countries. I assume that there are ""desirable"" and ""undesirable"" potential immigrants. In my model, countries simultaneously choose both an immigration quota and a level of ""scrutiny"" that would-be immigrants face, and then immigrants choose to which countries to apply. I analyze the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this model and derive policy implications. The third chapter analyzes a dynamic lobbying model in which two antagonistic lobbies compete with each other for a prize over two time periods that are linked through status quo bias. The attacker has to decide whether to attempt an attack on the status quo already in the first period or whether to wait. The attacker's behavior in the dynamic model differs from that in a comparable static model. Two antagonistic effects are the ""option value effect"" that is similar to the real option effect in the theory of investment decisions under uncertainty; and a ""defender discouragement effect"" that often makes change cheaper to achieve than in a comparable static model."

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Sahakyan, Zaruhi Mels

Contributors dc:contributor

• Esfahani, Hadi S.

• Political Science, General

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3347504

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85594