Three Essays on the Law and Economics of Information Technology Security

In Chapter 4, we study a model where cybercrimes are addressed through a combination of private and public measures, as well as study the public goods and externalities aspects of Internet security. We find that the socially-optimal level of security is achieved by equalizing the marginal-benefit-to-marginal-cost ratios of the different security measures. The interrelatedness of Internet risks causes firms to underinvest in private and public security goods. The government decidedly lowers the level of police expenditures to induce firms to invest in more precautions. Under certain conditions, cooperation results in socially-optimal levels of private and public security goods expenditures.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Majuca, Ruperto Pagaura

Contributors dc:contributor

• Thomas Ulen

• Computer Science

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3250284

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85579