Long -Term Agency Relationships and Human Capital Investment

The second part looks into situations where agents working in a team environment. The contract offers agents with a possibility of promotional prize, a fraction of an agent's own output and a share scheme of the firm's total output. Agents may allocate efforts into working on his own task assignments, helping team members and improving his own skills. We examine the decision making from agents' point of view within both short term and long term settings. Results of the models show that by adjusting the parameters of the contract, principal can affect agent's decision on their efforts allocation. Although the effects of agent's sharing of the outputs work similarly in different setting, the promotion prize may have completely different effects on the agent's decision.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Business Administration

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Ma, Sufeng

Contributors dc:contributor

• Susan I. Cohen

• Economics, Labor

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI9990070

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/84615