A Model on Cooperative Advertising of Trade Promotion

Cooperative advertising is modeled as a two-stage game with perfect information. It is first demonstrated that the equilibrium exists. Then, it is shown that (i) if the manufacturer does not change wholesale price: Schedules (a) and (c) generate the same profits to the manufacturer, under Schedules (a) and (c) the participation rates are set at 100 percent, under Schedule (c) the participation rate is binding always, and there is no dominant strategy among the three schedules; and (ii) if the manufacturer changes wholesale price Schedule (c) is a strictly dominant strategy and Schedule (u) is strictly dominated, under Schedule (a) the participation rates are strictly less than 100 percent, under Schedule (c) the participation rates can be set at 100 percent and the participation rate is always binding and in general, the characterization of the equilibrium under Schedule (c) is open, except in some special cases.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Business Administration

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Cao, Zhenzong

Contributors dc:contributor

• Monahan, George E.

• Mathematics

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI9812545

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/84591